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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ; 
STEVEN RAY ALLEN, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. 
i Docket No. 900156 
i Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2 (3) (i), in that the Defendant 
was convicted of a First Degree Felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The standard of review as to Point One, prior bad acts, 
is whether the evidentiary rulings raise a reasonable 
likelihood that absent error, the result would have been 
more favorable to Mr. Allen. Rule 30, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure: Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence. and 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 1989). The 
standard for review as to the Bill of Particulars is whether 
the denial of particulars erodes the confidence in the 
outcome of the trial and whether this error is harmless or 
prejudicial. State v. Bell, 770 P. 2d 100, 106 (Utah 1988). 
The standard as to the Motion to Elect is whether there is 
sufficient evidence in the record to support a specific 
statutory or factual theory. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 
563 (Utah 1987). As to the use of a General Verdict with 
Interrogatories, the standard is whether this form was 
necessary to properly focus the jury's attention on the 
facts of the case. State v. Bell, supra at 109. 
The standard for review of the Miranda issues in Point 
Two is, given the totality of the circumstances, whether the 
reviewing court should reverse the trial court's ruling as 
being clearly in error and an abuse of the Court's 
discretion. 
The standard for review of the issues of voluntariness 
is whether a preponderance of the evidence supports the 
court's findings that the statements were voluntarily made. 
State v. Moore, 697 P. 2d 233, 236 (Utah 1984), And, all 
errors on these issues will require a reversal of the 
conviction unless they are harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1213 (Utah 1989), 
citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). 
The standard for review of the issue of jury 
instructions in Point Three is whether there is sufficient 
evidence to entitle Mr. Allen to have his legal theory of 
the case placed before the jury if it would not be 
superfluous to do so, and whether the absence of the 
requested instructions had a substantial impact on the 
outcome of the trial. State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 159 
(Utah 1983), and State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39 (Utah App. 
1990). 
The standard for review of the issue of gruesome 
pictures in Point Four is whether the use of the photographs 
had probative value which was substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, and if so, whether in using 
the reasonable likelihood standard, the result would have 
been more favorable to the Defendant. State v. Dibello, 780 
P. 2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1989). 
The standard for review of the use of the diary in 
Point Five is whether the Court's ruling on this issue 
raises a reasonable likelihood that absent error, the result 
would have been more favorable to Mr. Allen. State v. 
Rimmasch, supra. 
The standard for review as to insufficient evidence 
claimed in Point Six is that the conviction should stand 
unless the evidence is insufficient after the reviewing 
court has viewed the evidence and all inferences that may be 
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989). 
The standard for review of the issues of the Motion to 
Dismiss in Point Six A, is whether reasonable minds could 
find all the elements of the offense of homicide in favor of 
the State. Rule 17 (o), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
Utah Code Annotated, 77-17-3; State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 
524 (Utah 1983). 
The standard for review of an arrest of judgment in 
Point Six B, is whether the facts at the trial do not 
constitute a public offense or other good cause is shown for 
an arrest of the judgment. Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure: State v. Eldredcre. 773 P. 2d 29, 38 (Utah 1989). 
The standard for review as to granting a new trial in 
Point Six C, is whether the Court abused its discretion by 
failing to determine that the errors at trial required a new 
trial. Rule 24 (a), U.R.Cr.P.: State v. Eldredcre, supra, 
at 38. 
The standard for review as to the cumulative effect of 
the multiple errors claimed in Point Seven is whether, 
first, there were errors, and second, whether the cumulative 
effect of these errors combined to deprive the Defendant of 
his right to a fair trial. State v. Bishop, 753 P. 2d 439, 
489 (Utah 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
There are no authorities directly dispositive of any of 
the issues of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction and commitment for 
the offense of homicide, a first degree felony. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Mr. Allen was charged in a four count Information with 
three counts of child abuse, and one count of homicide, a 
first degree felony, for events which transpired in Moab, 
Utah in 1986. In 1989, Mr. Allen was apprehended in Idaho, 
then taken to Montana, and later moved to Utah. 
Mr. Allen was convicted by a jury following a trial 
only as to the homicide offense, in February 1990. On March 
12, 1990, the District Court entered a Judgment, Sentence, 
and Commitment. A Motion for a New Trial was filed on 
March 19, 1990, and denied by the Court on March 28, 1990. 
A Notice of Appeal was filed on April 4, 1990. 
C. DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT 
The Court entered an order committing Mr. Allen to the 
Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Steven Ray Allen is 43 years old, highly educated, and 
well employed throughout most of his adult life. Beginning 
in the early 1980's, he abandoned this lifestyle after a 
failed marriage, and began living as a recluse in the 
mountains of the Continental Divide in Montana and Idaho. 
Suppression Motion, Tr. 110-111; Trial, Tr. 704-707. 
In October 1986, he left the Yellowstone, Montana area 
and rode his horse and pack mule to the Castle Valley area 
near Moab, Utah, for the purpose of engaging in winter 
trapping. He met and established a relationship with Debbie 
Barrie and her children, including Michael, age 3, the child 
Mr. Allen is convicted of killing. Tr. 710-711, 713. 
There followed, the State claims, a series of incidents 
in which Mr. Allen abused Michael and inflicted substantial 
injuries, and which culminated in Michael's death by 
suffocation on December 16, 1986. Testimony at trial showed 
that Mr. Allen had verbally abused Michael, and had beaten 
and kicked the child, inflicting bruises Tr. 310-312, 321-
322, 329 and, the State's medical experts also claimed, ten 
broken ribs suffered well before the child's death. Tr. 436, 
439. One such episode involved Mr. Allen hanging the child 
by his neck with his jacket, causing him to stop breathing, 
and which only ended when the mother intervened. Tr. 209™ 
210. Another incident involved injuries the child suffered 
in what Mr. Allen claimed to have been a motorcycle 
accident. Tr. 208. 
On December 16, 1986, Mr. Allen and Debbie Barrie, 
together with her children Michael and Matthew, went to Moab 
to shop. Debbie took Matthew into a store, leaving Michael 
alone with Mr. Allen in the family pickup truck. Shortly 
thereafter, Mr. Allen ran into the store carrying Michael's 
limp body, and calling for Debbie. Tr. 215-217. They rushed 
the unconscious child to the hospital, where the boy was 
pronounced dead after nearly an hour of determined 
resuscitation efforts by a physician and other emergency 
room personnel. Tr. 218-225. Debbie refused a request by 
the attending physician for permission to perform an 
autopsy, Tr. 226, instead making arrangements to have the 
child embalmed by a mortician, and left the next day with 
Mr. Allen and Matthew, and the child's remains, for Idaho 
where she planned to hold Michael's funeral. Tr. 226-227. 
Dr. Murray, the attending physician at the hospital, 
testified that he observed no injuries or other indications 
of child abuse, and approved of the release of the child's 
body to the mortician. Tr. 379. Other hospital personnel 
also testified that they observed nothing in terms of child 
abuse, although one nurse did recall a reddened mark on the 
child's chin which she thought may have been inflicted 
during resuscitative efforts. Tr. 399. Another witness who 
performed CPR testified that he felt what he believed to be 
a broken rib. Tr. 418. The mortician, who had some 
background in law enforcement, also examined the child and 
observed nothing suspicious. Tr. 696. 
However, while the family was enroute to Idaho, a 
relative alerted the Moab police to the possibility of child 
abuse, and the family was located in Bountiful where they 
were staying that night at a relative's home. Bountiful 
police questioned Debbie about the death. She again refused 
to allow an autopsy. Tr. 227-228. The family was allowed 
to again proceed on to Idaho, where the funeral was held. 
Prior to leaving, Mr. Allen destroyed several pages of 
Debbie's daily diary, which she later testified contained 
references to Mr. Allen's abuse of Michael. Tr.228-229. 
In the Spring of 1987, Debbie Barrie made accusations 
regarding Mr. Allen's treatment of the child, and instigated 
an exhumation and autopsy of Michael's remains. Tr. 228-229. 
Dr. Fantelli testified that he conducted the autopsy, 
and discovered eleven broken ribs, most of which were at 
least two weeks old or older, and one of which was fresh at 
the time of death, having occurred on the day of Michael's 
death. Tr. 436-439. He also observed several bruises of 
differing ages, Tr. 447, marks and abrasions in the temple 
area^ Tr. 448-450 unusual hair loss at the back of the head/ 
Tr. 446-447 bruises on the chest/ Tr. 453-454 and some 
slight brain swelling. Tr. 463. However/ Dr. Fantelli 
could not determine the cause of death/ Tr. 437, 495/ 502/ 
nor could he make a definitive diagnosis that Michael was a 
victim of the battered child syndrome/ Tr. 470/ although 
another expert, Dr. Robert Palmer, did render the opinion 
that the boy's condition was consistent with abusive acts. 
Tr. 527. However, Dr. Palmer likewise could not determine 
the cause of death Tr. 559-560/ nor could the attending 
physician/ at the hospital. Dr. Murray. Tr. 377-378. There 
was also considerable evidence discussed by the medical 
experts as to whether the child may have accidently 
aspirated a piece of Rollo's candy he was eating at the time 
he died, causing death under circumstances medically similar 
to those which would occur if the child had been 
deliberately suffocated. Seef e.g./ Tr. 564-567. 
Mr. Allen had returned to his solitary lifestyle, 
living in the isolated wilderness areas of the western 
United States until the summer of 1989 when Montana 
Sheriff's deputies located him on the Idaho side of the 
Continental Divide, and arrested him on August 12, 1989 
under fugitive warrants issued as a result of homicide and 
child abuse charges filed in Utah. Mr. Allen was taken 
without extradition from Idaho to Montana following an 
arrest which he claims involved repeated verbal and physical 
abuse by the arresting officers. Suppression Motion, Tr. 
113-124. The next day he made statements to a Montana 
Sheriff and an investigator with the Utah Attorney General's 
Office which implicated him in the death of Michael Barrie. 
These officers testified about these statements at trial, 
and refuted Allen's claims that these unrecorded statements 
were misunderstood, taken out of context, or in some 
instances, not said at all. The facts of Mr. Allen's arrest 
and subsequent interrogation will be more fully explored 
later in this brief in regards to the challenge to the 
admission of this evidence. 
Mr. Allen was subsequently taken to Utah. The three 
counts of child abuse were severed from the homicide count 
and later dismissed. Mr. Allen was convicted of homicide, a 
first degree felony. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court allowed the State to introduce at 
trial circumstantial evidence to show that Mr. Allen killed 
Michael Barrie where the medical evidence established no 
known cause of death. These same evidentiary techniques 
were employed to provide circumstantial proof of Mr. Allen's 
criminal intent in causing the child's death. The evidence 
in question involved incidents where Mr. Allen was accused 
of abusing the child and inflicting injuries several weeks 
prior to the boy's death. The death itself occurred while 
the child's mother left the boy alone with Mr. Allen in the 
family vehicle while she went into a store to shop for a few 
minutes. The bulk of the State's case centered on 
inferences that the jury made from these facts: The 
evidence as to the earlier instances of abuse, combined with 
medical evidence as to the child's condition as a result of 
these abuse incidents, and as to the child's condition at 
the time of death, and the application of the battered child 
syndrome, all show that death was not accidental but was in 
fact due to suffocation. A further inference is that Mr. 
Allen beat the child while killing him. And, these factors 
were also used to establish the specifics of the actual 
cause, method, and manner of death. It is the use of these 
evidentiary and pleading tactics which are clear error under 
the rather unique circumstances of this case. 
A second and decisive factor in Mr. Allen's conviction 
centered on the Court's ruling that his statements made to 
two law enforcement officers were admissible as evidence. 
These statements were obtained contrary to the Miranda 
requirements. They were also involuntary, obtained from Mr. 
Allen as a result of the abuse he received during the course 
of his arrest. The most egregious error in regards to this 
issue was the Court's refusal to even listen to a 
contemporaneous tape recording of the events of the arrest 
and abuse of Mr. Allen. And the jury was not allowed to 
consider anything at all as to the arrest, taped or 
otherwise. 
Numerous other errors occurred during the course of Mr. 
Allen's trial. These include the Court's denial of the 
right to have the jury instructed as to certain lesser 
included offenses, and the use of autopsy photographs of the 
child. These and other mistakes had the cumulative effect 
of prejudicing Mr. Allen's right to a fair trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD 
ACTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND RELATED EARLIER 
MEDICAL INJURIES OF THE CHILD WAS ERROR. 
A. ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS AND 
RELATED INJURIES VIOLATED RULE 404(b), UTAH 
RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
Evidence of an injury which causes death, as well as 
other injuries inflicted in earlier instances of abuse, are 
sometimes the only way to present a child's mute testimony 
of what really happened under circumstances where there are 
no witnesses. Prosecutors often attempt to use such 
evidence to link a pattern of abuse and consequent injuries 
with the end result, the death of a child. Rule 404(b), 
U.R.E.: State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983). Tanner 
approved of testimony of specific instances of abuse which 
were consistent with a blow to the head that killed a three 
year old child. Specific instances of prior abuse can 
therefore be relevant and admissible. They tend to 
establish a telltale pattern of conduct and silent proof of 
an actor's intent, thereby placing the child's death in a 
meaningful context in terms of cause and manner of death, 
and to show that the death was not accidental. State v. 
Tanner. supra, at 543-547. 
Justice Stewart warned the Tanner Court, at 551-557, 
that the unrestricted use of prior bad acts can go too far. 
This is precisely what happened to Mr. Allen in this case. 
Allen's sporadic acts of abusive conduct toward the child 
were used in a situation, unlike Tanner, where there was no 
established and known cause of death. The use of these 
acts, and the injuries claimed to be caused by them, allowed 
the jury to jump to the conclusion, unwarranted by the 
medical evidence, that Mr. Allen at some later date killed 
the child as well. The trial Court's ruling allowing this 
type of evidence provided the government with the luxury of 
being able to leapfrog over their responsibility to prove 
the critical elements of intent and cause of death, a result 
which the Tanner decision clearly cautions against, at 543-
544. 
Physicians testified that Michael Barrie had at the 
time of his death eleven broken ribs, with likely dates of 
injury ranging from two or three weeks to six weeks before 
death. Testimony by Michael's brother Matthew and others 
centered on Allen's physical or verbal abuse over the period 
of October through December, 1986. The State claims this is 
evidence of Allen's intention to kill the child on December 
16, 1986, and further, establishes the method or manner of 
how the child died, cause of death, and refutes any claim 
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death. The trial Court failed to balance the probative 
value of the earlier events of abuse with the need for such 
evidence to prove a particular issue, and allowed evidence 
to merely show Mr. Allen's criminal predisposition 
generally. State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988). 
None of the earlier acts of abuse show with any degree of 
certainty how or in what manner Mr. Allen killed the child. 
None of the earlier events shed any light on the question of 
the medical reasons for the cause of death. And the 
previous incidents, while at best showing an abusive 
attitude by Mr. Allen, certainly are not reasonably 
probative in establishing that Mr. Allen specifically 
intended to kill the child on the day of his death. 
The specific intent to kill may be properly inferred 
from the facts of the individual case. State v. Johnson, 
771 P.2d 1071, 1072 (Utah 1989). However, it is significant 
that no evidence was presented at the trial as to anything 
Mr. Allen did or said to the child on the day of Michael's 
death, or for days earlier, which could reasonably raise an 
inference that he in fact had the intention of committing 
murder or child abuse on December 16, 1986. Jury instruction 
number 22, (attached as Addendum Number One), Trial, Tr. 
867-868, exacerbates this problem. The instruction's first 
portion disclaims the fact that the Defendant's earlier acts 
should be used as proof he committed the offense for which 
he is charged. This instruction, particularly the second 
portion, confuses this concept by linking it too closely 
with the issue of criminnl intent The net rniult is that 
Mr. Allen'a earlier actions in I art do establish that he 
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case. For instance, in State v. Saad. 635 P.2d 1261, 1262 
(Kan. App. 1981), the Court approved the use of older 
fractures suffered by a child since they were consistent 
with the blow to the brain which caused a subdural injury 
similar to that found in the Tanner case. Likewise, the 
blows which killed the Tanner child were perfectly 
consistent with the other evidence. The use of the battered 
child syndrome highlighted a pattern of abusive conduct 
wholly consistent with the manner in which the child was 
eventually killed. 
The admission of evidence of the battered child 
syndrome impermissibly tainted Mr. Allen by raising 
inferences that the boy's condition as a result of earlier 
abuse incidents was in some way factually or medically 
related to the critical elements of cause, or method, or 
manner of death in a case where proof as to these issues is 
anything but clear. Trial, Tr. 427-428. 
The very use of the term "Battered Child Syndrome", in 
a situation where the State's own medical experts disagreed 
that the syndrome in this case existed (compare, Trial Tr. 
470, Dr. Fantelli, with Tr. 527, Dr. Palmer), clearly 
stigmatized Mr. Allen before the jury. This is precisely 
the sort of sweeping application which the Supreme Court 
cautioned against in Tanner, supra, at 543-544. 
And therefore, without a strong finding of the 
existence of the battered child syndrome, the use of the 
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his defense. Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution 
(relative to the right to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusations); State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987) 
cert, den., 484 U.S. 1044 (1988); State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 
100, 103-104 (Utah 1988); and Rule 4(e), U.R.Cr.P. The 
Court's failure to require that the State advance one 
consistent factual theory as to, inter alia, the cause, 
method, and manner of death placed the Defendant at a 
distinct disadvantage. Mr Allen was prevented from 
effectively preparing his medical expert, and from 
effectively challenging the contentions of the State's three 
medical experts. 
Similar problems existed regarding Mr. Allen's attempt 
to limit the State to one theory as to his intent or 
culpability. The many issues as to cause and manner of 
death were not necessarily consistent with each subsection 
of the homicide statute. Normally a defendant is not 
entitled to require the State to elect a theory as to which 
elements of the various subsections of the statute are 
applicable to the case. State v. Tillman, supra, at 563-
565; State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 257-258 (Utah 1989). 
However, both Tillman and Standiford also hold that 
while alternate theories as to a defendant's criminal intent 
can be presented to a jury without the need to elect any one 
theory of culpability, the other elements of a crime do 
require a unanimous verdict which is accomplished through an 
election of the State's factual theories. State v. Tillman, 
^"pri, it 577-580, 585-588? and State v. Standiford, supivi,,, 
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Rule 49(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows the 
Court to submit general verdicts with interrogatories. This 
requirement has been adopted for use in criminal cases as 
well. State v. Bell, supra, at 109. The verdict form 
facilitates convictions for lesser included offenses, which 
is certainly appropriate in this case. And, it is a useful 
means of assuring adequate appellate review. The Bell case 
involved a prosecution for violation of Utah's RICE statute 
under confused factual circumstances which had to be applied 
in determining a theory as to what the defendant actually 
did which amounted to a racketeering activity. The reasons 
for the Court's approval of this verdict form in Bell are 
therefore quite similar to those found in Mr. Allen's case. 
And since this tactic appears to be a right which a 
defendant may elect as his option, (compare Bell, at 109 n. 
19, with Justice Stewart's dissent, at 113) it would be well 
within the Court's authority and discretion to grant Mr. 
Allen's request in order to fairly deal with the manner in 
which the State was presenting the facts of the case. 
POINT TWO 
ALLOWING DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS WAS ERROR. 
A. ALLOWING THE STATEMENTS, WHICH WERE NOT 
VOLUNTARY, WAS ERROR. 
Mr. Allen had resumed living in the wilderness areas of 
Idaho and Montana after leaving Debbie Barrie in 1987. 
Unbeknownst to him, warrants had been issued for his arrest, 
and authorities had launched a massive publicity campaign 
"eking information as to his whereabouts. In August, 1989 
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One Sheriff's Deputy had inadvertently left on a pocket 
tape recorder which caught in vivid detail most of the 
portions of the arrest during which Mr. Allen was abused,, 
The Court accepted a written transcript of the tape 
recording, but refused to actually listen to the tape. Tr. 
150-151. The Court further refused any request that the 
tape be admitted and played to the jury on the issue of the 
voluntariness of Allen's statements to the police. Tr. 171; 
Trial, Tr. 789-794. And, the Court likewise ruled that the 
events of the arrest itself were too remote in time, some 
thirty hours from the interrogation, to be relevant on the 
issues of voluntariness, Suppression Motion, Tr. 169, and 
refused to allow Allen to testify at trial as to the events 
of his arrest as well. 
Mr. Allen is "...entitled to a reliable and clear-cut 
determination that the confession was voluntarily rendered". 
State v. Bishop, supra, at 463, citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 
U.S. 477 (1972). The State bears the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Allen's statements were 
voluntary. State v. Bishop, at 463 & n. 71. The Court must 
"...consider the totality of all the circumstances—both the 
characteristics of the accused and the details of the 
interrogation". Bishop, at 463 & n. 73, 74, 75. And this 
Court should therefore examine the entire record to make an 
independent decision as to whether Allen's statements were 
voluntary. Bishop, at 464, & n. 76. 
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the court disapproved ot " improprieties the I f 
before a confession was obtained, holding that these event * 
tainted a suspect's statements about thirty six hours later. 
The passage of time between events in Strain is similar to 
that found in Mr. Allen's case, and illustrates that the 
Court cannot, as it clearly did here, arbitrarily set a time 
in which an event is too remote to be relevant on the issue 
of voluntariness. In that regard, State v. Bishop, supra, at 
463-464, held that there is no "talismanic" definition of 
voluntariness which is mechanically applicable in every 
case. These rules were clearly violated when the Court 
refused to fully consider, or allow the jury to consider, 
the events of the arrest. 
The connection between the abuse Mr. Allen received 
during his arrest and his subsequent statements must be 
sufficiently attenuated to permit the use of that evidence 
at trial. One factor that courts consider in determining 
whether the taint has been sufficiently dissipated is to 
consider the extent to which the deterrent value of the 
exclusionary rule would justify condemning the evidence. 
United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984). The Court 
in this case failed to consider this issue, and that 
excluding Allen's statements would be more likely to deter 
similar future police misconduct. Leon, at 911 n. 7; Brown 
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975). 
Another troublesome aspect which bears on the question 
of admissibility is the fact that Allen was being illegally 
detained in Montana during the time of his questioning. The 
failure of the Montana officers to properly surrender Allen 
to Idaho authorities was a significant factor in his 
subsequent interrogation, since if provided *-h" opportunity 
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(Emphasis added). Crane, supra, at 688-689, citing 
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) ("a 
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense"). 
And, since evidence about the general environment in which 
the statements were secured is highly relevant to its 
reliability and credibility, Crane, supra, at 690, the 
exclusion of the tape recording in Allen's case is clearly 
inappropriate, especially since the Court refused even to 
listen to the tape itself. 
This Court's standard of review is whether the lower 
court's refusal to submit the circumstances of the arrest, 
and the tape recording, constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447, 451 (Utah 1987). The refusal 
to listen to the tape highlights the extent to which the 
Court abused its authority in this case. Since these errors 
are not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, this court must 
reverse Mr. Allen's conviction and order a new trial. State 
v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1213 (Utah 1989), citing Delaware 
v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986); State v. Hackford, 
737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987); and State v. Strain, supra, 
at 227 (which holds that the appropriate remedy when a 
confession is involuntary is a reversal and a new trial). 
B. ALLOWING THE STATEMENTS ABSENT COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
MIRANDA REQUIREMENTS WAS ERROR 
At trial, the State was allowed to introduce testimony 
by Investigator Hines, and Sheriff Printz. Their testimony 
focused on an interview which occurred the day following Mr. 
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defendant validly waives the right to counsel. United 
States v, Hill. 701 F.Supp. 1522, 1524 (D.Kan 1988). If the 
request for counsel is equivocal, further questioning must 
be limited to clarifying the nature of the request. State v. 
Griffin, 754 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah App. 1988); Smith v. 
Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 96, n. 3 (1984). Mr. Allen made both 
unequivocal and equivocal requests. 
One arresting officer began but did not finish the 
standard Miranda warning. Arrest Transcript, Tr. 4. Mr. 
Allen then arguably invoked his right to counsel during his 
arrest when he screamed "Read my rights", Tr. 5, followed 
later, Tr. 11, by: Detective Bailey, "What's your name?" 
Allen, "I ain't talkin' to you. I want to talk to somebody 
else." Bailey, "You talk to him then. I want your fuckin 
name." Nevertheless, the officers began questioning Allen 
as to his identity and other matters, even while inflicting 
physical and verbal abuse. Tr.5-10. The Court's failure to 
listen to the tape recording of the arrest prevented an 
accurate determination as to whether, and to what extent 
Allen invoked his right to counsel during his first 
confrontation with the police. 
Mr. Allen also testified that he requested counsel 
while being processed into the County jail. Suppression 
Hearing, Tr, 126, 127, 129, 131, 134-135, 141, 142. 
However, officers, including an F.B.I, agent, continued to 
visit and question him. Tr. 125-127. 
Upon learning of Allen's arrest on Saturday, 
investigator Hines rushed to Montana on Sunday with the 
express purpose of interrogating Mr. Allen. Sheriff Printz 
and Mr. Hines interviewed Allen, some thirty hours after the 
arrest, and the day before Allen could first be arraigned 
before an impartial magistrate. Tr. 33-38. Although Allen 
claims, and both Hines and Printz disclaim, that he 
specifically invoked his right to counsel during the 
interrogation, both expressly, and by refusing to answer 
certain questions, Tr. 134-135, it is his contention that 
his initial but equivocal request for counsel during his 
arrest acted as a bar to this subsequent interview. Under 
either theory, therefore, Allen's statements are 
inadmissible. State v. Griffin, supra; Smith v. Illinois, 
supra. And, Edwards v. Arizona, supra, at 484-485, 486, n. 
9, and State v. Bishop, supra, at 466, 467, hold that 
responses to post-invocation questioning may only be 
admitted when three tests are satisfied. First, it must be 
the accused, and not the officers who initiates questioning. 
Second, a defendant must make a knowing and intelligent 
waiver of the right to counsel. And third, the statements 
must have been voluntarily made. The circumstances 
surrounding Mr. Allen's interrogation fail to satisfy any of 
these three requirements. 
Mr. Allen did not waive his right to counsel or to 
remain silent. In that regard, the State bears a heavy 
burden of proving waiver. United States v. Hill, supra, at 
1524; United States v. Bent lev, 726 F.2d 1124, 1128 (6th 
Cir. 1984); and, Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 444; North 
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). By 
deliberately not reading the waiver portion of the Miranda 
form, Mr. Hines failed to alert Mr. Allen to a crucial 
aspect of his fundamental right to remain silent. This 
deception effectively prevented Allen from having a H...full 
awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned 
and of the consequences of the decision to abandon it." 
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S 412, 421 (1986). Any statements 
made by Allen after this deliberate omission, should 
properly have been excluded from evidence. State v. Strain,, 
supra at 224; Moran v. Burbine, supra. 
Another problem involves Mr. Allen's contention that 
his statements are inadmissible since his right to counsel 
came into play because he had been indicted some thirteen 
months before his arrest and interrogation. Patterson v. 
Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, (1988). The issue then involves the 
question as to whether there should be no post-indictment 
interrogation in the absence of counsel. Utah has not taken 
this position. Nor has the Supreme Court. Patterson, 
supra. 
However, this Court should consider that Allen was 
arrested thirteen months after the Information was filed, 
and that the charging officer, Mr. Hines, rushed to Montana 
to speak with the Defendant on the day before he was to 
appear in Court, Suppression Motion, Tr. 33-37, where he 
would undoubtedly be advised as to his need for counsel. 
Hines, in responding to a question as to the need for an 
immediate interview, said that the purpose was M ...to 
eliminate mostly jail contaminance" Allen would get from 
the prisoners, including advice to contact lawyers. Tr. 34. 
He also said that one of the first things he did when he 
arrived at the jail was to ask Sheriff Printz if Allen had 
contacted an attorney. Tr. 37-38. These circumstances/ in 
combination with the abusive circumstances of Allen's 
arrest, more than justify this Court in imposing a stricter 
standard as to post-indictment questioning than might 
normally be the case. 
Mr. Allen's situation is replete with violations of the 
Miranda standards, and were undoubtedly a critical factor in 
his conviction. These errors are not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, State v. Tuttle, supra, and therefore, 
this Court should reverse the result, and order a new trial. 
State v. Strain. supra, at 227. 
C. ALLOWING THE STATEMENTS IN THE ABSENCE OF CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE DEATH OF THE 
CHILD WAS CAUSED BY CRIMINAL MEANS, WAS ERROR 
Mr. Allen's statements to the officers should also not 
have been admitted by the Court on the grounds that the 
State must first prove by the introduction of clear and 
convincing evidence that a death occurred which was caused 
by criminal means. The elements of homicide, often called 
the "corpus delicti", must be independently proved before 
the incriminating statements can be introduced into 
evidence. State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 477-478 (Utah 
1988); State v. Rebeterano, 681 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 
1984); State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1977); State v. Ferry. 275 
P.2d 173 (Utah 1954). 
A key dispute in this case involves the cause, method, 
and manner of the child's death, and the extent to which 
this unexplained death was a result of criminal means. As 
argued supra, and infra, the State's evidence in regard to 
these points is neither clear, nor convincing. Allen's 
statements fail as to the issue of proof of the corpus 
delicti. This additional shortcoming certainly aggravates 
the Court's failure to otherwise comply with the Miranda 
requirements. 
D. THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS WERE 
INADEQUATE 
The trial Court concluded the suppression hearing by 
denying the Motion and making certain oral statements in 
that regard. Suppression Motion, Tr. 167-170, attached 
hereto as Appendix Number Two. No formal findings were ever 
issued by the Court. 
The Court concluded that the events of the arrest were 
too remote from the interrogation in terms of establishing a 
relationship between the two as far as proving that Allen's 
statements were not voluntary. The Court's comments on this 
issue were mere conclusions, offering few facts to support 
this decision. Indeed, the Court could not fully explore 
this issue since it had previously refused to even consider 
the events of the arrest by listening to a tape recording 
which was in fact the best evidence of Mr. Allen's abuse. 
In contrasting the evidence at the suppression hearing 
with the legal issues raised in Defendant's suppression 
memorandum, Judgment Roll and Index, p. 210-238, few of the 
significant issues were the subject of formal factual 
findings by the Court. Other factual issues not resolved by 
the Court include: 1) the effect of Allen's arrest in Idaho 
and illegal detention in Montana; 2) whether Allen had in 
fact invoked his right to counsel during his arrest, or 
during his detention, or at the time of his interview; 3) 
failing to resolve the conflict of the parties as to the 
accuracy of the arrest recording transcript in determining 
the actual circumstances surrounding the arrest; 4) failing 
to resolve the conflict as to the accuracy of the 
recollection of the participants in the interrogation, 
specifically, whether the statements constituted a 
confession, or if in fact were taken out of context, or, in 
some instances, not said at all; 5) establishing facts 
sufficient to determine whether Mr. Allen effectively waived 
his right to counsel and to remain silent; and 6) failing to 
establish the facts relative to whether Utah law requires 
counsel in post-indictment interrogations. 
The Court concluded that Mr. Allen had been provided 
ample opportunity to request an attorney without stating 
specific facts as to what the officers had done concerning 
this issue. The Court completely failed to address the 
crucial question of whether Mr. Allen knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to remain silent, other than to 
say that he was satisfied on this issue since Mr. Allen 
chose to answer some, but not all of the questions. 
Suppression Motion. Tr. 170. The Court discussed no facts 
dealing with the problem that one of the interrogating 
officers had failed to read Mr. Allen the bottom portion of 
the Miranda rights form. The Court did not make factual 
conclusions as to the significance of Allen not being asked 
to endorse, nor in fact signing, the waiver form. 
Factual evaluations underlying the trial Court's 
decision to grant or deny a Motion to Suppress are not 
disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). In order to allow a 
reviewing Court to consider the facts in support of 
suppression issues, adequate findings must be sufficiently 
set out in detail. Rule 12(c), U.R.Cr.P.: State v. 
Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 882 & n. 1 (Utah App 1990); State v. 
Lovearen. 798 P.2d 767, 770-771 (Utah App. 1990). The trial 
Court's brief conclusions as to its factual findings clearly 
failed to set out sufficient facts which would have 
supported its decision which conflicted so thoroughly with 
the many issues raised by the defense. 
This Court should, therefore, reverse the Court's 
decision and remand the case for more detailed findings. 
State v. Sierra, supra, at 981. 
POINT THREE FAILURE TO ALLOW THE JURY TO CONSIDER, AND 
FAILURE TO ALLOW DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS AS TO LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES, 
WAS ERROR. 
Due process entitles Mr. Allen to have the jury 
instructed on the theory of his case. Beck v. Oklahoma. 447 
U.S. 625, 637 (1980); State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 159 
(Utah 1983); and State v. Standiford, supra, at 266. The 
facts presented by the State raise two basic sets of 
inferences. One is that Mr. Allen committed some acts which 
were responsible for the child's death under either the 
theories of murder or manslaughter. And second, that he 
committed any of a variety of assaults or child abuse 
offenses. The defense accordingly submitted a second set of 
proposed instructions as to both child abuse, aggravated 
assault, and negligent homicide. Defendant's Second Set of 
Jury Instructions, Judgment Roll and Index, p. 548-565. The 
court denied the requested instructions. Trial, Tr. 859-860, 
862-864, 866. 
There was sufficient evidence to form a rational basis 
for a verdict acquitting Mr. Allen of homicide and 
convicting him of the proposed lesser included offenses. 
The same evidence the State used to show homicide, e.g., 
fresh bruises and one broken rib on the day of death could, 
if the jury did not find a cause of death for which Mr. 
Allen was responsible, raise inferences that he struck and 
injured the child, committing either aggravated assault or 
varying degrees of child abuse. Or, the evidence could 
point to negligent homicide if the jury failed to agree on 
the requisite intent for either homicide or manslaughter. 
State v. Tillman, supra, at 569 ("No unintentional, 
negligent, or accidental killing regardless of the 
circumstances can be first degree murder"). 
The absence of the requested instructions, in light of 
the evidence as it was at the end of the trial, had a 
substantial impact on the outcome of the case. State v. 
Baker, supra, at 159. Accordingly, it is appropriate that 
this Court reverse Mr. Allen's conviction and order a new 
trial. 
POINT FOUR ALLOWING THE JURY TO VIEW PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE 
CHILD'S REMAINS, WAS ERROR. 
Five photographs of the child's remains taken during 
autopsy were received into evidence and shown to the jury 
during the course of Dr. Fantelli's testimony. Trial, Tr. 
429-463. 
Rule 403, U.R.E., provides that relevant evidence may 
be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. However, the 
presumption is in favor of admissibility. State v. 
Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988). An exception to 
this general rule is gruesome photographs of a victim's 
corpse. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989). 
The Court failed to realize that the photographs in question 
created a substantial danger of undue prejudice outweighing 
the photographs' essential value as evidence. State v. 
Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 64 (Utah 1983). Each of the photographs 
failed to convey information that could not have readily 
been provided to the jury by less potentially prejudicial 
means. State v. Poe. 441 P.2d 512 (Utah 1968); State v. 
Wells, 603 P.2d 810, 813 (Utah 1979); State v. Garcia, 
supra, at 64; State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 
1986); State v. Lafferty, supra, at 1257; and State v. 
Dibello, supra, at 1229. 
All photographs and the bruises they depict, are not 
relevant to the crucial issues of the cause, method, or 
manner of death. Rule 402, U.R.E. Dr. Fantelli testified 
that none of the injuries was fatal. Trial, Tr. 475-476. 
And to the extent they are relevant to show course of 
conduct on the issue of suffocation, or criminal intent, Dr. 
Fantelli conveyed the necessary information in a less 
inflammatory way. He used an illustrative diagram, depicting 
the size, location and other significant aspects of the 
injuries. State's Exhibit I, received, Trial, Tr. 456. The 
diagram also enabled him to deal with Allen's contention 
that some of the bruises were inflicted by the hospital 
personnel during resuscitation efforts; and otherwise spent 
considerable time explaining to the jury the significance of 
each bruise or injury. Trial, Tr. 447-463. Dr. Palmer 
likewise testified on this subject. Tr. 518 et seq. So did 
Dr. Rothfeder. Tr. 636 et seq. 
None of the photographs showed anything that the 
laymen-jurors could discern as to the issues of the ages of 
injuries or what in fact had caused them. Therefore, the 
photographs had no real purpose other than to distract and 
prejudice the jury, a classic reason why this evidence, if 
arguably relevant, should be excluded as prejudicial under 
Rule 403, U.R.E. 
The court should also consider whether each photograph 
is "gruesome" in its impact. Although each may not be as 
objectionable as some of those found in other cases, e.g., 
State v. Bishop, supra, at 493-494 (Justice Zimmerman 
concurring), they do reveal a small child with unsettling 
injuries as depicted when the body was exhumed some four 
months after death. 
There is a presumption of unfairness in the use of 
these photographs because they are "...subject to being used 
to distort the deliberative process and skew a trial's 
outcome". State v. Dibello, supra, at 1229. The use of 
these photographs in this case in combination with the wide 
ranging use of the defendant's prior bad acts, as argued 
above, should undermine the Court's faith in the fairness of 
the trial process. Therefore, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that absent the use of these pictures, the 
trial's result would have been more favorable to Mr. Allen. 
POINT FIVE ALLOWING THE JURY TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE 
DEFENDANT DESTROYED A DIARY OF CERTAIN EVENTS 
OF THE CASE, AND TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE OF THE 
CONTENTS OF THE DESTROYED PORTIONS OF THE 
DIARY, WAS ERROR 
The child's mother was allowed to testify that Mr. 
Allen destroyed several pages of her daily diary, and was 
further permitted to testify that the contents of these 
pages included references to Mr. Allen's ill-treatment of 
the boy. Trial, Tr. 228-229. A related issue is the 
problem involving the Court's refusal to permit the defense 
to inspect the entire diary, the original of which is in 
the hands of the prosecution. Motions Hearing, February 12, 
1990, Tr. 19. The Court also failed to review the entire 
journal covering the periods in question in making its 
decision. Motions Hearing, February 22, 1990, Tr. 3-4. The 
use of the contents of a document which no longer exists, as 
proof of the facts described in the writing is at best 
highly questionable. There can be no real foundation as to 
the accuracy or trustworthiness of the facts that Mrs. 
Barrie claimed were on the missing pages, c.f., State v. 
Bertol, 664 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983). The evidence is 
nothing more than an unverifiable set of self-serving 
declarations by the writer, and not proof of the facts 
therein. United States v. Sherfey, 384 F.2d 786, 788 (6th 
Cir. 1967). The evidence is simply hearsay, and excludable 
under Rule 802, U.R.E. And, this testimony in no way 
qualifies as one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Rule 
803, 804, U.R.E. 
The use of the diary in this fashion could only raise 
before the jury an irrefutable presumption of Allen's guilty 
knowledge, a situation wholly different from the usual 
cases, e.g., State v. Garcia, supra, where a Defendant's own 
conduct following a crime may be evidence of consciousness 
of guilt. Because of the limited relevance of this 
evidence, compared to its potential for prejudice, it should 
have been excluded under Rule 403 U.R.E. Therefore, if the 
jury had not been allowed to entertain this still another 
distraction, the result of the trial surely would have been 
more favorable to Mr. Allen. State v. Rimmasch, supra. 
POINT SIX THE EVIDENCE, PARTICULARLY AS TO DEFENDANT'S 
INTENT, AND AS TO WHETHER HE IN FACT CAUSED 
THE CHILD'S DEATH, WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE CONVICTION 
In determining that the evidence in this case is 
insufficient to support the conviction, this Court should 
view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from them in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. State v. Verde, supra, at 117. These facts are: 
The evidence of the earlier incidents of abuse in terms of 
Allen's pattern of conduct and motives, combined with 
medical evidence as to the child's condition as a result of 
the abuse incidents, and as to the child's condition at the 
time of death and the application of the battered child 
syndrome, all show that death was not accidental, but was in 
fact due to suffocation. A further inference is that Mr. 
Allen beat the child while killing him. There were also 
inferences raised that the child choked on a piece of candy, 
causing death under circumstances similar to those which 
would occur if the child had been deliberately suffocated. 
The State has the clear burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Allen committed some act which 
caused the child's death. State v. Wessendorf. 777 P.2d 
523, 526 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Bassett, 495 P.2d 318, 
319 (Utah 1972). In State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 
1983), the Court stated: 
"circumstantial evidence alone may be competent to 
establish the guilt of the accused so long as it 
excludes every reasonable hypothesis other than the 
Defendant's guilt", 
citing State,v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 (Utah 1982); State v. 
John, 586 P.2d 410 (Utah 1978); State v. Schad, 470 P.2d 246 
(Utah 1970) . 
Two cases illustrate the Court's reluctance to sustain 
murder convictions where cause of death is speculative 
because of lack of medical evidence or, because the evidence 
is lacking as to a specific death-causing act of the 
defendant. The courts are primarily troubled by the lack of 
criminal intent in such cases. In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443 (Utah 1983), the evidence was insufficient to sustain a 
murder conviction where there existed mere skeletal remains 
in an unnatural position combined with testimony as to 
"dreams" the Defendant had about a killing. Petree, at 447, 
specifically held that even if the evidence showed the 
Defendant killed the child, the case still failed on the 
issue of whether he intentionally or knowingly did so. And, 
in State v. Bassett, supra, the Court reversed a 
manslaughter conviction because the evidence did not show a 
specific act on the part of the Defendant. 
Still other cases establish that clear evidence of an 
intentional or knowing state of mind is required for a 
murder conviction. State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424-425 
(Utah 1986); State v. Tillman, supra, at 569 ("No 
unintentional, negligent, or accidental killing regardless 
of the circumstances can be first degree murder"). 
Those cases stand in contrast to others where there is 
strong medical evidence of a cause of death. State v. 
Valdez, 748 P. 2d 1050 (Utah 1987) (drowning); State v. 
Fisher, 680 P.2d 35 (Utah 1984) (strangulation); State v. 
Watts, supra (peritonitis due to rupture of small intestine 
caused by blow); And, State v. Tanner, supra (subdural 
hematoma caused by blow to head). 
There were inferences raised by the attempts to dispose 
of the body, Trial, Tr. 230-231, attempts to conceal the 
death by preventing an autopsy, Tr. 228, attempts to hide 
incriminating evidence, such as the destruction of the 
mother's diary, and other suspicious acts. The Courts have 
held that these types of inferences cannot supply the 
element of intent necessary to obtain a murder conviction. 
State v. Bassett, supra, at 319. And, in Stafford v. People, 
388 P.2d 774, 778 (Colo. 1964), the Court considered certain 
types of inferences which distinguished murder from 
manslaughter. Similar reasoning can be applied to the facts 
of this case. Mr. Allen is, taking the case in its best 
light, guilty of manslaughter and not murder. So, the Court 
could, if Allen's other defenses fail, simply remand this 
case with instructions as to the entry of a manslaughter 
conviction. 
Attention should be drawn to two other defects in the 
State's circumstantial evidence. Their evidence does not 
exclude every reasonable hypothesis. For instance, 
considerable testimony was heard as to the very likely 
possibility that the child choked on a piece of candy which 
in turn caused death under circumstances which would be 
medically similar to the suffocation claimed to have been 
inflicted by Mr. Allen. This issue alone raises a serious 
suspicion that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
conviction. And, the other involves the bruise on the 
child's chin, put there, the State argues, when Allen 
gripped the boy's mouth in order to suffocate him, in spite 
of the testimony of one nurse who thinks she did it. Trial, 
Tr.399. 
A. THE FAILURE TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE, AND AT THE CLOSE 
OF ALL THE EVIDENCE, WAS ERROR 
An issue which closely follows the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence concerns the Court's refusal to 
grant Mr. Allen's Motion to Dismiss at the close of the 
State's case, and at the close of the evidence. Rule 17 (o) 
U.R.Cr.P: UCA 77-17-3. If reasonable minds could not find 
all of the elements of first degree murder, and Mr. Allen 
has strongly so argued in regards to the issues of cause of 
death and his criminal intent, then the Court should have 
dismissed the State's case. State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 
524 (Utah 1983) . 
The purpose of this procedural safeguard is designed to 
keep the Defendant, under appropriate circumstances from 
having to endure the hardship of putting on his case and 
thereby risking an unwarranted conviction. State v. Smith, 
supra. The Court's failure to grant Mr. Allen a dismissal 
clearly violates this standard. 
B. THE FAILURE TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR AN 
ARREST OF JUDGMENT, WAS ERROR 
Another issue related to the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence concerns the Court's refusal to 
order the arrest of the judgment. Rule 23, U.R.Cr.P. Prior 
to sentencing the Court can arrest judgment if the facts do 
not constitute a public offense, or for other good cause. 
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Owens, 753 P.2d 976, 978 (Utah App. 1988). Jury confusion 
as to the facts are grounds for an arrest of judgment. 
State v. Gentry, supra at 1035. State v. Jukanovich, 146 P. 
289 (Utah 1915) dealt with such an issue in the context of a 
lesser included offense. Mr* Allen's situation, both as to 
the sufficiency of the evidence and the cause of death in 
terms of the requisite intent for first degree murder, 
entitles him to this procedural protection. The Court's 
refusal to grant this motion, therefore, is clearly error. 
C. THE FAILURE TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL WAS ERROR 
The final issue in regards to the sufficiency of the 
evidence involves the Court's denial of the Motion for a New 
Trial. Rule 24 (a), U.R.Cr.P. This motion should be granted 
in the interest of justice or to correct errors at trial. 
State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 221 (Utah 1985). Mr. 
Allen's arguments as to both the use of marginally 
circumstantial evidence and such problems as displaying 
Defendant's prior bad acts to the jury, certainly qualify as 
grounds for a new trial. State v. Burke, 129 P.2d 560 (Utah 
1942); State v. BeBee, 195 P.2d 746 (Utah 1948). 
In Dotv v. Town of Cedar Hills, 656 P.2d 993, 997 (Utah 
1982)
 f the Court held that the errors of law at trial, 
compounded with the subsequent denial of a new trial motion, 
constituted an abuse of the Court's discretion. The Court's 
refusal to grant Mr. Allen the remedy of a new trial rather 
than undergoing an appeal, was clearly in error. 
POINT SEVEN THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE MULTIPLE ERRORS 
IN THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL PREJUDICED 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
Mr. Allen's final point on appeal is that the multiple 
errors prejudiced his right to a fair trial. State v. 
Bishop, supra at 489; State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191 
(Utah 1987). The unrestricted use of the Defendant's 
earlier abusive acts toward the child, the marginal 
inferences taken from the evidence, the failure to provide 
the lesser included offense instructions, as well as the 
many mistakes evident in the admission of Allen's 
statements, all support his claim of multiple error. 
Additional problems, such as the use of the child's 
autopsy pictures and the irrefutable "proofH of the self-
serving declarations contained in the destroyed portions of 
the mother's diary, while not themselves decisive, should 
heighten the worrisome feeling that justice was not done in 
this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse Mr. Allen's conviction and 
grant a new trial. 
Dated this 19th day of March, 1991. 
Eric P. Swenson 
Michael H. Wray / 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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APPENDIX NUMBER ONE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You have heard evidence that the defendant committed acts similar 
to acts alleged to have occurred incident to the crime charged her. You 
may consider such evidence, not to prove that the defendant did the acts 
charged here, but only to prove defendant's state of mind, that is, that 
the defendant acted with the necessary intent and not through accident 
or mistake. 
Therefore, if you find: 
1) that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
f\\e defendant committed the acts charged in the information, and 
2) that the defendant committed similar acts at other times, 
then you may consider these similar acts as evidence that the defendant 
committed the acts charged here deliberately and not through accident or 
mistake. 
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APPENDIX NUMBER TWO 
when the question of extradition came up. By that time, the 
questioning was over, and it certainly didn't have any 
violation of the Sixth Amendment Rights as to the 
questioning that occurred here. 
Finally, Your Honor, I would ask also that as you 
consider the Motion to Suppress, if you could also consider and 
rule on today the defendant's Sixth Motion in Limine as to whether 
the tape recording of the arrest will be admitted at trial. 
That becomes important for the state at this point because 
assuming that the Motion to Suppress is denied, and assuming that 
the confession can be introduced, we will have to either 
maintain certain witnesses here or bring them back to refute 
some of the things that have been alleged as to what occurs 
on that tape and to explain physically what was going on, 
which is not as the defendant represents that it was. So it 
would also help us if we could have a ruling on that Sixth 
Motion in Limine at the same time. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Swenson? 
MR. SWENSON: No, Your Honor. We appear to 
have a dispute, both as to the facts and the law. I think 
you've had a pretty good hearing from both of us, and we 
appreciate the court's consideration. 
THE COURT: Of course, we do get conflicting 
statements — absolutely conflicting statements between the 
defendant and the sheriff and Mr. Hines; particularly 
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relative to any mention of an attorney. Of course, that 
brings into question the creditability of the witnesses. 
The court is not too impressed with the defendant's 
statement relative to his credibility when he says — at the 
same time he says: "Well, I'll only answer questions my 
attorney tells me to," and then he proceeds to answer all 
kinds of questions. That doesn't make sense. If he said 
that, he would say: "My attorney is not here, so I'll not 
answer any questions." A lot of things he doesn't remember, 
saying he doesn't remember them; but then he says: "I do 
remember that when the sheriff stepped out to get a Coke, 
that's when Mr. Hines told me that he was going to "fry my 
ass." And what else did he say? Let's see — He remembers 
that the sheriff wasn't there at the time, because the 
sheriff doesn't remember that ever being said. And, oh, 
yes; he remembers Mr. Hines saying: "You're going to do 
five to life, and I'm going to fry your ass." That's what 
he said that Mr. Hines said, and he remembers, of course, 
that the sheriff was not present. And, of course, the 
sheriff denies he ever heard any such statement. So the 
court, of course, believes the sheriff and Mr. Hines when 
they say that he was informed relative to his rights. 
People with experience in law enforcement ordinarily know 
what is good evidence and what isn't. So I can't find in 
this evidence that anybody was trying to trick Mr. Allen, or 
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trying to get him to say anything involuntarily or anything 
he didn't want to say. 
I think the incidents of his arrest were too far 
removed; and even though they may have been abusive, and 
there might have been a certain amount of name calling done 
at that time, at the time of the interview he himself says 
he was under no fear. There has been no showing of any 
causal connection between anything that occurred at the time 
of his arrest and at the time of the interview that would 
influence him to answer questions that he wasn't otherwise 
ready to do. And without that causal connection, of course, 
the cases hold that then it doesn't — we don't take that 
into account. 
The court further finds that he had ample opportunity 
and was offered opportunities to obtain an attorney if he 
wanted one before the questioning took place. I can't find 
anything inconsistent with the attempt to interview Mr. 
Allen the day after the arrest as imputing anything — any 
ulterior motive to anyone. In fact, on the contrary, as the 
interviewer, Mr. Hines brings his tape recorder and says: 
"I want to record it." But the defendant says: "No, you're 
not." And so he takes the tape recorder and puts it in his 
briefcase• If there was skullduggery, he would have left it 
on or done something. So it looks to me like they were 
bending over backwards to make sure the defendant was aware 
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1 of what his rights were, and that he didn't have to talk to 
2 him, and they honored his request that he could answer what 
j questions he wanted and not answer what questions he did not 
4 want to answer. 
5 So the court basically gives creditability to the 
6 testimony of Mr. Hines and the sheriff. 
7 The court finds that the state has sustained its burden 
g to show there was no coercion; there was not outside 
9 influence, and that the court finds that the defendant was 
10 aware of what his legal rights were, and he was told what 
.I they were, and that he voluntarily agreed — at least to 
f waive those rights as far as answering questions that he 
15 wanted to answer and not answer questions which he did not 
f want to answer. And there were some of the questions that 
f. he did not answer that were asked of him. So it shows he 
.£ knew he had that right, because he refused to answer certain 
17 questions. And that's obvious, and that's what Mr. Hines 
1g told us, and that's what the sheriff said. So it gives 
|9 creditability to their testimony of what he knew and what he 
2j) didn't know. He knew he had the right to remain silent, 
2f that he had the right to request counsel, and that at no 
„ time during the interview did he attempt to say: "I want an 
attorney now, and I won't talk to you," although he knew he 
2 4 had that right and didn't interrupt at any time and do that. 
25 So the court denies the Motion to Suppress. 
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